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I.

Introduction
Data protection is a rapidly changing field. Consequently, different nations’ standards for using

and managing data often vary drastically from one another. For example, the European Union (EU)
and the United States (US) have taken substantially different views on what measures are necessary
to protect data. The two nations have produced starkly divergent data protection laws, leading to
inevitable conflicts whenever data is transferred from the EU to the US. The EU’s new General Rules
of Data Protection (GDPR) affects the majority of international trade that depends on data flows. It
imposes new obligations on data processors before transnational transfer of European data can occur
and has an extended territorial scope. Thus, third-party nations are put to the hard choice of whether
to adopt their own nation-wide privacy regime in order to comply with the GDPR. The EU can use
its market power to push other nations towards adopting its international data protection standard.
This ongoing dispute over data protection has the potential to affect US domestic policy and the
domestic policies of other third-party nations who wish to transfer data from the EU.
This paper argues that the convergence of third-party countries towards a GDPR-type privacy
standard is both impossible and undesirable. First, many countries do not consider privacy a
fundamental human right or, if they do, they must weigh privacy against other values, such as free
speech, in ways that lead to lower levels of privacy protection than in the EU. Second, requiring thirdparty nations to either adopt a uniform privacy regulation or use firm-specific compliance in order
to transfer data is too costly and burdensome for developing countries. This paper argues that thirdparty countries and the EU can build off of the EU-US Privacy Shield agreement as a means to
resolve the conflict between regulatory heterogeneity and the desire for free international data flows.
A recognition agreement with the EU similar to the Privacy Shield would be less costly for thirdparty countries and would not impose burdens on firms performing data transactions at home or
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with nations other than the EU. Cross-border commitments could create a new framework for global
privacy protection while supporting, not inhibiting, digital trade.
II.

The EU’s Approaches to Data Protection
The EU embraces a fundamental right of privacy for citizens, both online and offline. The

notion that everyone has the right to protect her own personal data is plainly stated in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, a document designed to explain the basic rights of
European citizens and provide guidelines relating to those rights. 1 The European Convention of
Human Rights also includes a right to privacy. 2 The fact that the EU attaches stringent protections
to its citizens’ individual privacy is not surprising, considering that most Europeans are only one or
two generations removed from fascist or communist governments who strictly monitored their
citizens’ personal lives. 3 The EU experienced firsthand the dangers of governmental intrusion and
then decided to provide sweeping safeguards for its citizens’ individual privacy.
A. The Data Protection Directive
In October 1995, the EU agreed on a Data Protection Directive (DPD) to harmonize differing
national legislation on data privacy protection. 4 The DPD is an omnibus legislation protecting
personal data. The previous approach was fragmented country-by-country. The DPD sets out
common rules for public and private entities in all EU member states that hold or transmit personal
data. The DPD governs how information about European citizens can be collected and used across

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article 7, Oct. 26, 2012 (C 326) 393, 397 (explaining that
“[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.” Article 8 concerns
the protection of personal data, stating: “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or
her.”).
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 222,
Art. 8.
3 Theresa M. Payton & Theodore Claypoole, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: Recognizing Threats, Defending Your
Rights, and Protecting Your Family, 250 (2014).
4 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data (Data Protection
Directive).
1
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industries, with each EU member state responsible for implementing the Directive through its own
national laws.
The DPD provides that the transfer of personal data to a country outside of the EU may occur
only if the European Commission determines that the country provides an adequate level of
protection of personal data. The adequacy of a country’s protections is assessed in light of all of the
circumstances surrounding the data transfer, with particular focus on the nature of the data, the
purpose and duration of the proposed processing operations, and the final destination’s laws, rules,
and security measures. 5
B. The General Rules of Data Protection
The DPD succeeded in providing a cohesive framework for protecting citizen data privacy,
but was considered inadequate by many in the EU because it was only a directive. In an effort to
keep pace with technology, offer greater protection to EU citizens, and better harmonize data
protection laws, the EU Parliament approved the final text of the General Rules of Data Protection
(GDPR) in 2016. 6 It officially replaced the DPD on May 25, 2018. The GDPR is a uniform regulatory
regime, ensuring that one system of data protection law governs the entire EU. Unlike the DPD, the
GDPR is a regulation, which means that it is a binding legislative act enforceable as law in each EU
Member State. Because it is a regulation, it did not need to be enacted into each country’s legal
framework. Upon implementation, it automatically resulted in one comprehensive data protection
law in the EU, instead of twenty-eight. However, it does have several “opening clauses” permitting
EU Member States to modify certain GDPR provisions. 7

Id.
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L
119/1.
7 Id. The GDPR contains over 50 opening clauses, which allow EU Member States to put national data protection laws
in place to supplement the GDPR. Basically, these clauses let Member States introduce more restrictive applications of
5
6
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The GDPR has six key principles relating to the processing of personal data. It provides that
personal data shall be:
(a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject
(‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’); (b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes;
further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to
be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); (c) adequate, relevant and
limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (‘data
minimisation’); (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must
be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for
which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’); (e) kept in a form
which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes
for which the personal data are processed; personal data may be stored for longer periods
insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public
interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance
with Article 89(1) subject to implementation of the appropriate technical and organisational
measures required by this Regulation in order to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data
subject (‘storage limitation’); (f) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the
personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against
accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures
(‘integrity and confidentiality’). 8

the GDPR via local legislations. Many EU Member States subsequently passed National Data Protection laws
supplementing the GDPR.
8 Id. at Art 5.
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The GDPR also contains a broader territorial scope than the DPD. It applies whenever an
organization physically operates anywhere in the EU, whenever data processed concerns an individual
within the EU, or whenever the national law of a Member State applies to benefit public international
law. It also enumerates stronger rights of control for data subjects and higher penalties for company
violations.
The GDPR sets out to tackle the same goal as the DPD, protecting the fundamental rights of
EU citizens concerning their personal data, but pursues the goal slightly differently. Data subjects
covered by the GDPR receive remedial rights, including the right to compensation for controller or
processor violations that result in damages. 9 For example, an entity who infringes a GDPR provision
concerning cross-border data transfers is subject to administrative fines of 20,000,000 EUR or four
percent of its worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year. For a multibillion dollar
company, four percent of worldwide annual turnover can equal hundreds of millions of dollars. This
is a very significant penalty for noncompliance with the GDPR. Thus, many companies are changing
their data protection practices now to avoid enormous penalties later. The remedial rights embodied
in the GDPR make the regulation’s reach global.
C. Transferring Data to Third-Party Countries
Under the GDPR, data can only be transferred outside of the EU under certain conditions.
The primary condition allowing for data transfer requires the European Commission to first find that
the third country receiving the personal data provides an adequate level of protection. 10 Under Article
45, an adequacy decision enables data transfers to a third-party nation if the third-party can ensure
that its country’s data security standards are sufficient to comply with those in the EU. Adequacy
determinations allow for the simplest process for data transfer because they require no additional

9

Id. at Article 5.
GDPR Article 45.

10
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safeguards to be implemented by a business and no additional authorization requirements. However,
an adequacy decision remains subject to periodic review by the European Commission.
The GDPR provides a comprehensive list of the considerations taken into account in making
an adequacy finding. The considerations largely reflect those from the Article 29 Working Party
approach. 11 The considerations include the existence of the rule of law, the existence of legislation on
public security, whether there are effectively enforceable rights including administrative and judicial
redress for data subjects, and whether there are international commitments entered into by the thirdparty country. 12 In practice, the third-party country must have a privacy regime in place that is
essentially equivalent to the EU’s. 13 This equivalence must relate not only to the level of data
protection, but also to whether government agencies’ access to personal data and data subjects’ rights
of redress are consistent with the GDPR’s provisions.
More countries have begun to pass comprehensive data protection laws in order to receive
adequacy determinations from the EU. However, the US has continued to follow a segmented
approach consisting of specific agencies regulating certain types of data. Some US states have passed
their own privacy laws, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act. But the US has not implemented
a federal data privacy law that would open the door for an EU-US adequacy decision. However, the
GDPR allows the European Commission to make an adequacy determination with respect to a single
territory or particular sectors within a third country. 14 This opens the door for the Commission to find
that specific states or economic sectors within a country provide an adequate level of protection for
transfer. This enabled the EU and US to reach the EU-US Privacy Shield, serving as an adequacy
determination only applying to specific economic sectors in the US.

GDPR Article 41.1-2.
GDPR Article 45.2.
13 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case No. C-362/14 (E.C.J. Oct. 6, 2015).
14 GDPR Article 45.3.
11
12
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If a nation does not receive an adequacy determination, there are still alternative options
available to be able to transfer personal data outside of the EU. In the absence of an adequacy
determination, the GDPR allows for data to be transferred outside of the EU pursuant to various
safeguards or a derogation. 15 Companies that implement appropriate safeguards, 16 including Standard
Contractual Clauses (SCCs) and Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs), can legitimately engage in crossborder transfers. SCCs are standardized contractual clauses between two legal entities reviewed and
approved by the European Commission. The biggest hurdle to implementing SCCs is the very high
administrative costs associated with implementing hundreds of model clauses into each contract
entered into by a company. BCRs are a compulsory code of conduct within a group of companies or
enterprises engaged in the same economic activity. The final validation of a BCR can take over a year
and also involves high expenses.
III.

Negotiations With Third-Party Countries
The transatlantic economies are highly integrated. For example, commercial exchanges of

goods and services between the EU and the US amount to nearly $1 trillion annually. 17 Both the EU
and the US are deeply connected to the Internet; as a result, the largest intercontinental internet data
flows are across the Atlantic. These data flows form the backbone of the transatlantic economy, both
for direct e-commerce purchases of goods and services and for almost all business relations between
the EU and the US. An enormous amount of data is exchanged between the US and the EU every

The primary derogation is explicit consent. GDPR Article 44. Article 46 allows for cross border transfers of data
absent an adequacy decision with the presence of appropriate safeguards. Article 49 lists appropriate situations for
safeguards and derogations.
16 GDPR Article 46: “a controller and processor may transfer personal data to a third country or an international
organization only if the controller or processor has provided appropriate safeguards, and on a condition that enforceable
data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available.”
17 CRS Report R43387, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) Negotiations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar,
Vivian C. Jones, and Renée Johnson. See also CRS In Focus IF10120, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(T-TIP), by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones.
15
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day, amounting to billions of dollars each year. 18 However, the GDPR’s more stringent data protection
requirements have the potential to disrupt these data flows. Due to the two nation’s divergent data
protection laws, conflicts will continue to arise when data is transferred to the US. This dispute has
the potential to affect US domestic policy.
The GDPR’s requirements will likely also affect domestic policy in third-party nations other
than the US. Despite a claimed common interest in free data flows, the extraterritorial impact of Article
25 illustrates the EU’s ability to exercise coercive market power on other nations. By using its
considerable market power as bargaining leverage, the EU itself can strengthen other third-party
nations’ data protection laws. Third-party countries are essentially forced to either adopt similar data
protection provisions to the GDPR or negotiate bilateral agreements. By using adequacy decisions as
a barrier to enter the EU market, the EU privacy regime has succeeded in ratcheting up privacy
protections in other countries.
A. EU-USA Privacy Shield
It took nearly five years for the EU and the US to agree upon the Safe Harbor in 2000 as a
mechanism under which US firms could transfer personal data from the EU to the US in compliance
with the DPD. Before reaching the agreement, EU’s principal concern with allowing data transfers to
the US was that the US lacked a generally-applicable law regulating the way in which firms can process
personal data. As a general matter, the US Constitution, US statutory law, and US Supreme Court
caselaw limit the extent to which governmental and law enforcement authorities can intrude into
private space. Some laws restrict what private sector actors in specific sectors can do with personal
data, in particular in the finance and healthcare sector. Similar laws have been enacted at the state level
in various parts of the US, leading to a diverse picture of privacy law in the US. Thus, while in some

Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of the EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting
Up of US. Privacy Standards, 25 Yale J Intl L 1, 39 (2000).
18
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areas data protection rules are more stringent in the US than in the EU, there is no general requirement
that data controllers or processors obtain unambiguous personal consent from individuals before
using their data in each economic sectors.
Because the US does not have a general law protecting personal data, the European
Commission did not approve the US as an “adequate” destination under the DPD. However, the two
parties agreed on a mechanism that would allow certain US companies to meet the “adequate level of
protection” required by the DPD. The Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, issued by the Department of
Commerce in 2000, was a creative solution to allowing data flows to continue. 19 Under the Safe
Harbor, US-based companies can receive personal data from the EU if they use one of the following
mechanisms: join the EU-US Privacy Shield program, provide appropriate safeguards (i.e. contractual
clauses or binding corporate rules), or refer to one of the GDPR’s derogations. Around 4,500 firms
pledged to adhere to the Safe Harbor principles and were consequently considered “adequate” for
personal data transfers. 20
The Safe Harbor was invalidated after revelations by Edward Snowden about the US
government's ability to access data held by companies. 21 Five thousand companies previously relied
on the now-invalidated measure to ensure successful data transfers. 22 Fortunately, just as economic
necessity drove the US and the EU into the first Safe Harbor agreement, it drove them again to craft
a new agreement. The US government and the EU eventually reached a new deal: the EU-US Privacy
Shield. 23 The Privacy Shield arrangement places even more stringent obligations on firms that transfer
personal data to the US. It includes stronger obligations for companies handling data, increases
65 FR 45665.
Natalia Drozdiak and Sam Schechner, EU Court Says Data-Transfer Pact with US Violates Privacy, WSJ October 6,
2015.
21 FTC, US-EU Safe Harbor Framework, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/u.s.eu-safe-harbor-framework.
22 Natalia Drozdiak and Sam Schechner, EU Court Says Data-Transfer Pact with US Violates Privacy, WSJ October 6,
2015.
23 FTC, Privacy Shield, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/privacy-shield.
19
20
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transparency regarding how data is used, safeguards against US governmental access to data, and
provides new protections and remedies for individuals. It is based on self-certification by firms that
they will comply with key privacy principles. In 2016, the Privacy Shield agreement was modified to
clarify issues related to transfers to third countries and provide more explicit data retention terms.
These changes led to an adequacy decision on July 12, 2016, just as the 14th Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) round began. 24 However, the Privacy Shield remains widely contested,
especially in light of the changes brought on by the newly enacted GDPR. The Privacy Shield is being
reviewed by the EU's European Court of Justice in light of the GDPR; if the US’s privacy regime is
again found wanting, a new and even more acrimonious debate is likely to occur.
The US will likely continue to hear chastening from European regulatory bodies, which may
lead to changes in the US’s data protection regime. States have begun to pass their own privacy
legislation. In addition, in response to the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica debate, several members
of Congress drafted federal regulations mirroring the GDPR and suggested the possibility for US
standards based on EU principles. It is still unclear how the moving pieces in the global privacy
regulation world will settle. If EU data privacy regulations take the day, they could influence more
than just multinational corporations with EU customers. The tug of war between the US and EU on
the validity of the Privacy Shield will continue to signal the strength of EU’s convictions and the
future of global privacy legislation.
B. Other Countries
The US is not the only nation entangled in the EU’s prohibitions on the transfer of personal
data — the European Commission has only found a few countries outside of Europe as providing
adequate protections. Thus far, the European Commission has recognized Andorra, Argentina, Faroe

EU-US Data Transfers, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/dataprotection/international-dimension-data-protection/eu-us-data-transfers_en.
24
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Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Uruguay as
providing adequate protection. The EU’s decisions on Canada and the US are only “partial” adequacy
decisions, meaning that data transfers to Canada and the US are still limited by various safeguard
requirements. The adequacy decision on Canada only applies to private entities falling under the scope
of the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. 25 The EU-US
Privacy Shield framework is a “partial” adequacy decision: only companies committing to abide by it
benefit from free data transfers.
The EU desires to increase the number of adequate countries for transfer and is using its
enormous weight as a trading power to encourage other countries to adopt strong data protection
rules. For example, data protection was a major issue in the recent EU–Japan trade agreement finalized
in the beginning of 2019. The EU sought to carve data protection completely out of the agreement,
but Japan worried that its ability to sell digital products and services to the EU would be compromised
without the certainty of an EU “adequacy” decision for data transfers to Japan. To secure an adequacy
decision under the GDPR, Japan made data protection assurances to the EU and agreed to implement
new rules to bring its data protection system in line with European regulations. Japan also created a
framework for handling data-related complaints from Europeans. Consequently, in tandem with the
finalized trade deal in January 2019, the EU issued a determination that Japan provides adequate
protection for personal data. European Commissioner Vera Jourova stated that the new agreement
between Japan and the EU created the “world’s largest area of safe data flows.” 26 This series of events
could very well set a pattern for the EU's future trade negotiations.

2002/2/EC: Commission Decision of 20 December 2001 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided by the Canadian Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (notified under document number C(2001) 4539), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32002D0002.
26 EU-Japan Deal to Protect Data Exchanges Takes Effect, France24, (January 1, 2019),
https://www.france24.com/en/20190123-eu-japan-deal-protect-data-exchanges-takes-effect.
25
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The European Commission may decide to reevaluate existing adequacy decisions, primarily in
light of the new obligations in the GDPR. It may even decide to limit or withdraw agreements that
fall short of the comprehensive agreement between it and Japan. In Canada, whose own partial
adequacy decision will be reviewed in 2022, officials still remain wary of overhauling their domestic
rules to mimic the EU’s. However, politicians continue to hold parliamentary hearings to discuss
potentially revamping their laws in case their privacy deal with the EU becomes jeopardized. If Canada
loses its adequacy determination, Canada could certainly decide to quickly rewrite its laws to conform
with the EU’s desires.
Canada and Japan are examples of the EU exerting its soft power to compel compliance with
its data protection standard. These massive steps in data privacy and transfer will undoubtedly have
global repercussions. Other countries are already beginning to follow suit. The EU and South Korea
are exploring the idea of an adequacy decision, which would create an even bigger flow of data between
the EU and other nations. Only time will tell if this will lead to global cooperation in the realm of data
privacy or an even more isolated approach as countries aim to create their own different brand of data
security. Now that Japan has secured an adequacy decision under the EU’s GDPR, which opened up
a channel of free-flowing data between the two nations, several other countries could follow suit.
IV.

Can Other Nations Conform with EU’s Privacy Standards?
Advanced economies like Japan can afford and are able to take the steps needed to conform

with the EU’s privacy standards. For example, Japan set up an independent agency to handle privacy
complaints in order to conform with the GDPR during negotiations for the new Japan-EU trade deal.
But, for emerging countries, the cost and administrative burden of applying the EU privacy standards
may be daunting. It also may be viewed as a form of imperialism. In countries like South Africa, whose
domestic legislation is primarily based on the EU’s rules, the changes brought by the GDPR may be
viewed with hostile eyes as an example of the EU extending its powers in a form of imperialism. Yet,
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despite third-party nations’ dislike of the GDPR’s influence, any country not working towards the
GPDR’s standards is left out in the cold.
The GDPR confronts developing countries with a dilemma. If they seek an adequacy
determination, then they must enact a national privacy law essentially equivalent to that of the EU.
Argentina, Uruguay, and a few other countries have chosen to do so. However, a national law imposes
the same data protection standard on all firms in the country, regardless of whether they sell exclusively
at home or also abroad. This uniform and stringent standard could have adverse effects on developing
businesses who operate solely in developing markets. The GDPR standard, which may be appropriate
in an advanced country with well-developed markets and comprehensive access to services, is not
necessarily also appropriate in poorer countries. Stringent privacy laws could hurt the efficiency and
development of financial and other markets by inhibiting the flow of information within the market.
Enacting this national privacy legislation would increase the cost of doing business in the economy,
which would hurt competitiveness in foreign markets that do not have EU-like privacy regulations.
In addition, regulatory approaches to privacy are really mediated by cultural norms and will
inevitably have to vary across countries. For example, Nordic countries have traditions of transparency
and have thus maintained digital public databases of individual citizens’ salaries and income tax
records. This disclosure of financial information would contradict the US’s traditions and strict laws
protecting financial information. However, the US makes criminal records public, whereas such
information is not available across the EU. Many academic studies have documented cultural
differences in opinions about privacy and their implications for policy. These cultural differences
suggest that exporting the GDPR’s one-size-fits-all approach to other nations with digital platforms
may not be optimal to realize what other countries want in terms of data protection.
Unfortunately, the alternatives to imposing an EU-like standard in order to get an adequacy
decision and comply with the GDPR impose the same costs. Both BCRs and SCCs require that a data
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controller or processor who can be held liable for breaches must be established in an EU Member
State. The requirement of an EU presence increases the costs of compliance for small firms and limits
the benefits that could be gained from a cross-border digital trade. Developing countries are faced
with the hard choice of accepting nation-wide EU standards or incurring the substantial compliance
costs associated with BCRs and SCCs in order to comply with the GDPR.
A. India as an Example
The GDPR poses a challenge for a country like India. A significant portion of India’s services
exports rely on cross-border data flows. Nearly forty percent of India’s exports consist of software
and information-technology services. 27 Virtually all of these cross-border exports rely on international
data flows. In order for India to provide these services, it often must collect data from EU citizens.
So, its exports are heavily affected by changes in and compliance with EU’s privacy laws.
India is in the process of developing its own privacy regulation, but it does not have a regime
that would be deemed adequate by the EU. As a developing country, India’s approach to privacy must
balance the risks of breaches of privacy with the economic potential of data use. A national law would
require all firms to adhere to the same stringent privacy standard regardless of which foreign or
domestic market they serve. The result could be an economy-wide increase in the costs of doing
business.
In the absence of an adequacy finding, firms in India would need to rely on BCRs or SCCs to
access EU personal data. But BCRs and SCCs are costly. A survey in India of the impact of the lessstringent DPD showed that the BCR process took six months and the SCC process took more than

Aaditya Mattoo and Sacha Wunsch, Pre-empting protectionism in services—the GATS and outsourcing, Journal of
International Economic Law 7, (4), December 2004, at 765–800.
27
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3 months. 28 The GDPR requirement for a physical presence in the EU in order to utilize BCRs and
SCCs further limits opportunities for many businesses to use the internet to sell services globally.
V.

Solution
Instead of these traditional approaches, it may be more fruitful to build on a relatively recent

model of international cooperation. When the EU first enacted the GDPR, US privacy protections
were deemed inadequate and transatlantic data flows were threatened. In response, the EU and the
US negotiated a Safe Harbor Agreement, updated after the Snowden revelation as the EU-US Privacy
Shield Agreement. The core of the deal is a promise by US firms to protect the privacy of EU citizens
at levels equal to EU standards in return for unrestricted data flows. The bound companies’
commitments are monitored and enforced by US institutions, primarily the FTC and the Department
of Commerce. The Privacy Shield Agreement helps restore legal certainty in the transfer of data across
the Atlantic, but there will remain a level of uncertainty until the Court of Justice rules on the
underlying adequacy of democratic controls in the USA.
By recognizing US conformity under the Privacy Shield, the EU created a valuable opening
for other nations. Importantly, the World Trade Organization (WTO) law on services trade requires
that the EU must offer other countries an opportunity to negotiate comparable arrangements. 29 So,
developing countries could take advantage of this opportunity to negotiate a similar agreement and
strengthen their case for recognition.
This kind of recognition agreement with the EU would have big advantages over existing
options. First, unlike under BCRs and SSCs, firms would not be required to establish a costly presence
in the EU. Second, the assessment of conformity with EU standards would take place at home by

NASSCOM-DSCI (National Association of Software and Services Companies—Data Security Council of India). 2013.
Survey of the Impact of EU Privacy Regulation on India’s Services Exporters.
29 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) says that when two governments have agreements recognizing
each other’s qualifications, other members must also be given a chance to negotiate comparable pacts. The recognition
of other countries’ qualifications must not be discriminatory and it must not amount to protectionism. See Article VII.
28
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domestic regulators. Third, unlike in the case of getting an adequacy decision, firms would not be
obligated to adopt more stringent or costly standards for the data involved in transactions that take
place purely at home or with countries that are less demanding than the EU. Countries would be free
to tailor domestic standards to their own domestic needs and use different standards with different
foreign needs!
Countries could self-select into specific arrangements, be it a EU-US Privacy Shield-like
agreement or another mutually binding obligation on source and destination countries. As a first step,
the data source companies could specify conditions unilaterally and determine conformity unilaterally,
but also lend additional transparency and predictability to their own requirements by listing them for
other nations to see. They could then go further and recognize conformity assessment in specific data
destination countries when they trust its enforcement, even though their norms diverge. These steps
could pave the way for mutually binding obligations on source and destination countries.
VI.

Conclusion
The ability to move data freely across borders forms the foundation of successful international

trade. However, the GDPR’s mandate that countries either adopt EU-like national privacy regulation
or require their firms to incur the costs of using BCRs and SCCs puts developing countries in a bind.
This paper argues that regulatory convergence towards GDPR-like standards is undesirable for
economic and normative reasons for developing countries. However, the EU-US Privacy Shield
agreement offers a way to resolve the conflict. The Privacy Shield represents an innovative bargain:
the data destination country promises to protect the privacy of foreign citizens consistent with their
own national standards and in return the source country commits to not restrict the flow of data.
This kind of cross-border commitment could help create a framework for global privacy protection
while also supporting digital trade with developing nations.
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